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Abstract
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An effective tax system is fundamental for successful 
country development. The first step to understand public 
revenue systems is to establish some commonly agreed 
performance measurements and benchmarks. This paper 
employs a cross-country study to estimate tax capacity 
from a sample of 104 countries during 1994-2003.  
The estimation results are then used as benchmarks 
to compare taxable capacity and tax effort in different 
countries. Taxable capacity refers to the predicted tax-
gross domestic product ratio that can be estimated with 
the regression, taking into account a country’s specific 
economic, demographic, and institutional features. Tax 
This paper—a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network—is part of a larger effort in the 
department to support developing countries in revenue policy reforms. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted 
on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at bmorenododson@worldbank.org@worldbank.
org.  
effort is defined as an index of the ratio between the share 
of the actual tax collection in gross domestic product and 
the predicted taxable capacity.  
   The authors classify countries into four distinct groups 
by their level of actual tax collection and attained tax 
effort. This classification is based on the benchmark 
of the global average of tax collection and a tax effort 
index of 1 (when tax collection is exactly the same as 
the estimated taxable capacity). The analysis provides 
guidance for countries with various levels of tax collection 
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I.  Introduction 
 
The conventional argument for raising tax revenues as an underpinning for economic and 
social improvement is being coupled with additional lessons emerging from recent aid-
effectiveness dialogues.  The idea is that attention to tax policy and administration is 
necessary if a country is to avoid the external aid dependency trap that undercuts accountable 
governance and, in turn, sustainable efforts toward poverty reduction.   
 
The World Bank’s World Development Report (1997) emphasized the essential role of 
government in allocating resources and highlights that taxation and expenditure are essential 
tools for macroeconomic stabilization, growth, and development.  In the long run, countries 
must rely on an effective tax system to meet the needs of the public sector.  However, most 
developing countries have not been able to raise sufficient revenues for essential public 
infrastructure and human development services [World Bank Global Monitoring Report 
(2005)]. 
 
The United Nations report on Financing for Development (2002) highlighted the importance 
of mobilizing own-financial resources in order for nations to grow and develop. Emphasizing 
that financing an adequate level of public expenditure while limiting budget deficits calls for 
substantial tax revenues, the report  further concludes that most countries of the developing 
world must undertake significant tax reforms if they are to raise the required additional 
revenues.  The UN Secretary-General’s Report to the Preparatory Committee for Financing 
for Development (2002) reinforces this message.
1   
 
An effective tax system is fundamental for successful development.  There is a large volume 
of theoretical and empirical literature on taxation that attests to the increasing attention that 
this topic has received from both academics and policy makers.  The problems for developing 
countries to raise revenues are twofold.  First, they typically have limited taxable capacity 
and a large share of economic activity in the informal sector.
2  Second, their tax regimes may 
be riddled with numerous tax relief initiatives and/or or tax expenditures, which further 
deplete the tax base and tends to reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of tax collection 
efforts.   
 
A first step in understanding revenue systems is to establish some commonly agreed upon 
performance measures and accompanying benchmarks.  This is the motivation for and main 
focus of this paper. The paper particularly deals with the concept and empirical estimation of 
countries’ taxable capacity and tax effort.  The analysis and findings of the paper are intended 
                                                 
1 Inter alia, the Report recommends (i) taking measures to ensure that the incidence of taxation falls 
equitably across income classes as well as across different categories of income and consumption; (ii) 
extending the tax base to cover incomes from activities that are not currently taxed; (iii) expanding indirect 
tax productivity and structural equity by targeting the growing (and, yet, often tax-excluded) service sector; 
and (iv) recognizing that regardless of how well designed a nation’s tax policy may be, how such policies 
are implemented and administered will determine the ultimate impacts (“tax administration-is-tax policy”). 
2 The growing consensus among tax economists is that a higher share of informality supports for 
introduction of a value added tax (VAT) for both revenue and equity purposes; some consumption in the 
informal economy cannot completely evade the tax as part of it eventually is picked up by the VAT (see, 
for example, Bird and Gendron, 2007).     
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to provide a starting point for tax policy discussion and design.  The structure of the paper is 
as follows.   
 
Section II provides an overview of the worldwide trend in revenue collection, using the 
common tax-to-GDP index as the cross country benchmark for collection.  Section III 
highlights some critical problems in using the tax-GDP ratios to measure tax performance 
and extends the existing literature to the empirical estimation of a country’s taxable capacity.  
This section also shows a comparison between a country’s actual collection and its estimated 
taxable capacity to derive an index of tax effort.  On the basis of their respective level of 
actual collection and tax effort, four distinct groups of countries are classified distilling some 
policy implications for revenue reforms.  Section IV concludes with a summary of the overall 
pattern and worldwide trends in tax performance and brief remarks on the challenges in 
designing an effective tax reform program. 
 
II.  Pattern and Worldwide Trend in Taxation 
 
Tax economists and tax practitioners usually rely on, inter alia, the ratio of tax collection as a 
share of gross domestic product (GDP) to assess the level of collection effort of a country and 
establish worldwide patterns and trends for tax collection efforts.  The index is calculated on 
a regional or income classification basis, and also country-by-country.  To provide deeper 
analysis of a country’s tax performance in comparison with its peers, existing tax collection 
structures are also assessed using the share of each type of tax in GDP or in the total tax 
collection.  The measurement and interpretation of such indexes are relatively simple and 
straightforward.   
 
This section provides an overview of the regional and international pattern and trend in tax 
collection, using the conventional tax-GDP ratios.  To specify how the pattern has changed in 
the past decade (1994-2003), the data are collected from 104 countries and presented in three 
benchmark years: 1994, 1998, and 2003.  The data are from IMF Government Finance 
Statistics (GFS) and the World Development Indicators (WDI).  Each country’s data are 
weighted equally and the countries in the sample for which GDP data are available are 
divided into regions and income groups.
3  The data reconfirm the patterns and trends already 
presented by a number of leading economists (Bird 2007;Fox, et al. 2005).   
 
First, tax collection for a country – as a percentage of GDP (measured at market prices) – 
usually rises as the country’s per capita income level increases.  Second, region-specific 
patterns of collection have been established, which may well reflect certain common features 
of socio-economic conditions and tax regimes in the neighboring countries.   
 
                                                 
3 The regional and income group classification is based on the World Bank definition. The World Bank 
classifies countries into four groups by their income level on the basis of 2005 GNI per capita (unit of 
currency: USD): Low income group includes countries with GNI per capita of $825 or less; lower middle 
income, $826–3,255; and upper middle income, $3,256–10,065; and high income, $10,066 or more.  For 
the purpose of our analysis, we have formed three groups of countries:  Low income countries with the 
2005 GNI per capita of $825 or less, Middle income countries, $826–10,065, and High income countries, 
$10,066 or more.   
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Per Capita Income and Tax Revenue Linkage 
 
Figure 1 indicates that in 1994, 1998, and 2003, higher income countries collected higher tax 
revenues and the pattern holds for all the three groups of countries of different levels of 
income per capita.  In the high-income countries, the tax-GDP ratio increased dramatically 
from 21 percent to approximately 30 percent over the decade.  The levels of collection efforts, 
however, did not significantly change for the groups of low- and middle-income countries.  
Low-income countries’ collections stayed relatively flat, at around 14 percent, while middle-
income countries experienced a modest increase from 20 percent to 21 percent.  The 
observed trend in tax collection implies that low-income countries are being trapped in a 
structural dilemma:  they typically have low taxable capacity – coupled with inefficient 
collection structure overwhelmed by trade and consumption taxes – while having enormous 
needs for resources to finance development needs.   
 
A general established trend is that, in aggregate, tax intake increases over time:   the average 
of tax-GDP in all groups of countries rose from approximately 19 percent in 1994 to 22 
percent in 2003.  A number of demand and supply factors account for the tax-income 
relationship. For example, the demand for public goods and services may rise faster in higher 
income countries where urbanization tends to rise at a faster speed compared to the one in 
lower income countries; and it is usually easier to collect taxes in urban areas with higher 
concentration of the formal sector (Bird 2007).  In addition, there are other issues related to 
good governance and application of voluntary tax compliance philosophy on the basis of 
improved taxpayer service and enforcement in advanced tax administrations that help 
enhance revenue collections. 
 
Figure 1: Central Tax Revenue as a Percentage of GDP by Income Group (1994-2003) 
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Geographic Location and Tax Revenue Linkage 
 
Figure 2 exhibits that there are established patterns of tax collection by region and that such 
patterns have not changed much over the past decade.  Countries in the same geographical 
region are likely to share certain commonalities in their tax structures due to their similar 
economic and social factors as well as their imitation in the choice of tax regimes.  In some 
cases, this similarity also reflects tax coordination policies and trade integration.  However, 
that does not mean that the compliance with the statutory tax provisions is enforced in the 
same way in every country and therefore the actual tax collection may vary considerably 
within a region.  In addition, diversity within the same regional group appears quite striking 
as countries endow different natural resources and might not necessarily follow the same 



















Source:  IMF GFS; WDI. 
* Note:  The region classification follows the World Bank approach:  Sub-Saharan Africa (AFR), East Asia 
and Pacific (EAP), Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), Middle 
East and North Africa (MNA), and South Asia region (SAR). 
 
The regional pattern of tax collection (Figure 2) shows that the ECA region tax share has 
outperformed other regions.
5 However, the share declined from the peak of 27 percent of 
GDP in 1994 to 25 percent in 2003 reflecting the “transition” economy era when central 
governments reorganized and, some, devolved fiscal roles.  Collection effort in AFR was 
similar to the one in LAC in 1998 and higher than in any other regions, except for ECA.  The 
overall tax collection in AFR has increased over the years (from 20 percent in 1994 to 23 
percent in 2003).  EAP, a high growth region, has relatively lower tax intake compared with 
                                                 
4 For example, some African countries, such as South Africa, Botswana, and Lesotho, have reached tax 
revenue ratios similar to those in middle/high income countries, while others like Congo or Guinea Bissau 
have maintained the lowest ratios in the world. 
5 It is interesting to make some comparison of tax collection between regions and countries in the OECD.  
Since the late 1990s, the OECD on average consistently collects more taxes as a share of GDP than any 
regional averages.  The collection has been consistently high with the average of 32 percent in 1998 and 
2003.  A close look at the high income OECD countries reveals that the highest tax intake can be found in 
the so-called welfare states such as Finland, Sweden, and Norway with the tax-GDP ratios respectively 
reaching 35, 34, and 37 percent in 2003.     
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any other region, and SAR exhibits the lowest ratios.  Overall, the tax collection as 
percentage of GDP has somehow improved in AFR and LAC countries, stayed relatively flat 
in EAP and MNA, and decreased in SAR.
6 
 
The review of the tax-GDP ratios indicates that the tax collections tend to be linked 
positively to a country’s level of income.  In addition, there are clearly established regional 
patterns of the aggregate tax collection, despite significant intra-regional variation in 
collection due to multiple institutional and different fiscal architectures.  Part III explores in 
details the determinants of taxable capacity and the empirical approach to measure it.   
 
III.  Expanding Taxable Capacity and Reaching Revenue Potential:  Empirical 
Evidence and Policy Implications  
 
The Concepts of Taxable Capacity and Tax Effort 
 
The actual tax to GDP (or GNP) collection ratio is usually interpreted as a measure of tax 
effort and used as the basis for cross country tax comparison.  The use of such ratio is 
reasonable if one attempts to establish trends or to compare tax revenue performance across 
countries with similar economic structure and at the same level of income (Musgrave 1987).
7  
The advantage of using this approach is that it is simple and provides a quick overview of the 
trends of the worldwide tax collections (Section II).    
 
However, when used to compare the effectiveness in revenue mobilization across countries in 
different income groups, the tax-GDP ratio could provide a “completely distorted” picture 
due to different economic structures, institutional arrangements, and demographic trends 
(Prest 1979).  In essence, this ratio does not reflect the tax capacity of a country and hence it 
is impossible to assess whether or not a country is out of line in comparison with its peers in 
its effort to raise domestic tax revenues.   
 
A number of tax economists have attempted to deal with this problem by applying an 
empirical approach to estimate the determinants of tax collection and identify the impact of 
such variables on each country’s taxable capacity.
8  Taxable capacity is the predicted tax-
GDP ratio estimated from a regression, taking into account the country’s specific 
characteristics.  Tax effort is the index of the ratio between the share of the actual collection 
to GDP and the predicted taxable capacity.  A tax effort of above 1 (high tax effort) implies 
that the country utilizes well its tax base to increase revenues (Stotsky, et al. 1997).  On the 
other hand, a country with the tax effort below 1 (low tax effort) is likely to have relatively 
substantial scope or potential to raise revenues.   
                                                 
6 One should interpret the data with great caution.  The tax collection in SAR may be much more 
decentralized than in any other region, and the available data are largely for the central government 
revenues. 
7 In the early 1970s, international tax advisors used the ratio of 18 percent, postulated by W.A. Lewis, as an 
arbitrary benchmark for a desirable minimum level of tax collection (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1974).   
8 See, for example Lotz and Mross, 1967; Bahl, 1971; Chelliah et al. 1975; Tait et al., 1979, Tanzi, 1987; 
Stotsky and WoldeMariam, 1997; Bird et al., 2004.   
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The concepts of taxable capacity and tax effort can be extended to measure (fiscal) revenue 
capacity and (fiscal) revenue effort.  Total fiscal revenue, by definition, consists of both tax 
and non-tax collection; it represents cash receipts from taxes, social contributions, and non-
tax sources such as fines, fees, rent, and income from property or sales.    
 
One should be cautious about the methodology used to estimate and interpret the tax effort 
index.  The calculation of the index is sensitive to the predicted results of a country’s taxable 
capacity.  There exist certain caveats typical in empirical work such as systematic errors in 
measurement of independent variables.  Other caveats, including the quality of the GDP 
measurement, are inherent in both tax effort indexes and tax-GDP ratios.  More importantly, 
the measurement of the taxable capacity is based on, a priori, set of explanatory variables that 
determine the potential capacity of a country to tax, but it does not reflect either the demand 
for higher public expenditures or the political willingness to tax (Bird 1978;Toye 1978).   In 
addition, as the taxable capacity is estimated from a regression specification, inherently the 
tax effort index reflects the tax collection performance of a country in comparison with the 
average effort exercised by an average country in the selected sample. However, the 
“average” performance may not be directly relevant to the actual performance of a particular 
country; thus one may need to simply interpret the tax effort index as an indication for 
assessing the feasibility of raising additional revenues, given the tax mix policy and 
collection effort attained at the average level (Ahmad, et al. 1986).   
 
Due to multiple potential issues related to the methodology used to estimate and interpret tax 
effort indexes, Chelliah et al. (1975) emphasize that “the tax effort indexes are not intended 
to be applied in a mechanistic fashion but rather to be considered useful additional 
information in judging the scope for more taxes.” (P.195.)  Tax effort cannot substitute for a 
comprehensive study of taxation in direct relation with the need for and composition of 
public expenditures of a particular country.  This section provides an overall assessment of 
worldwide tax performance, using the concept of tax effort with due attention to its potential 
caveats.  We conduct an empirical analysis to estimate a country’s taxable capacity and tax 
effort over the period of 1994-2003 and the two sub-periods of 1994-99 and 2000-03.   
 
Empirical Analysis of Taxable Capacity and Tax Effort 
The Model and Data 
 
In this study, we extend the empirical methodology applied by Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), 
and Bird, Vazquez, and Torgler (2004) to cover a large sample of 104 countries for the ten 
year period 1993-2004.  To analyze the dynamics of taxable capacity and tax effort across 
countries between the 1990s and early 2000s, we also look at the two sub-periods: 1993-1999, 
and 2000-2004.  Following Bird et al. (2004), we apply the empirical approach to both tax 
and total fiscal revenue efforts to test the robustness.  The basic specification is:  
 
  ) , , , , , ( it it it it it it it BUREAU CORR AGR TRADE POP GDP f Y =  
 
Where, 
t i Y : Tax (including social contributions) or total fiscal revenue ratio to GDP.    
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it GDP : GDP per capita (constant 2000 $US). 
it POP : Rate of population growth or age dependency ratio as a share of the total 
population. 
it TRADE : Trade openness (measured as ratio of exports plus imports of goods and 
services to GDP). 
it AGR : Agricultural value added. 
it CORR : Corruption index. 
it BUREAU : Bureaucracy quality. 
 
 
The underlying hypothesis of the specification is that the tax or fiscal revenue capacity of a 
country is determined not only by economic factors but also by key demographic and 
institutional characteristics.  In particular, high corruption, high population growth rates, and 
high age dependency ratios tend to depress the taxable capacity of a country, other things 
being equal. 
 
There are two major sets of the independent variables tested.  The first part consists of 
traditional supply side factors, including GDP per capita, population growth rate, 
international trade, and agricultural value added as a fraction of GDP. The data are mainly 
obtained from the World Bank’s WDI (World Bank 2006).  The second part includes the 
proxies for the institutional setting of a country.  To test the robustness of the institutional 
impact on a country’s taxable income, two alternatives are used:  the corruption index and the 
bureaucratic quality scores.  The indexes are obtained from the Institutional Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG).  Annex 2 presents descriptions and data sources for each variable used in the 
model.  
 
GDP per capita.  GDP per capita is included in the regression as a proxy for the level 
of development of a country.  In our analysis, GDP per capita is measured in constant 2000 
USD. As a higher level of income typically correlates with a greater demand for public goods 
and services, and higher income increases the overall ability to pay in a society, one should 
expect higher tax payment and collection (Bahl 1971;Fox, et al. 2005).  By analyzing the 
recent worldwide trend and pattern of revenue collection, we also demonstrate that richer 
countries tend to collect more revenues, and similarly, countries tend to collect more 
revenues as they become more affluent (Section II).  One would expect the sign of the 
coefficient on GDP per capita in the regression to be positive 
 
Population growth rate and age dependency ratio.  To test the impact of 
demographic characteristics on a country’s taxable income, we use two alternatives, 
specifically population growth rate and age dependency ratio.  Bird et al. (2004) suggest that 
as the rate of population growth increases, the tax system may lag behind in its ability to 
capture new taxpayers.  This problem is more pronounced when a country has weak tax 
administration capacity.  Thus, the population growth rate is expected to be negatively related 
to the tax capacity.  An alternative approach to measure the impact of the demographic 
feature on the taxable capacity is to use the age dependency ratio indicator.  Consistent to the 
World Bank WDI definition, this indicator is the ratio of the dependents – people younger 
than 15 or older than 64—to the working age population—those in the productive age   
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between 15 and 64.  It is expected that the higher the age dependency ratio, the lower the 
productive population and hence the narrower the tax base.  Thus, we would predict that 
demographic characteristics, both population growth and age dependency ratio, are 
negatively correlated to the tax and fiscal revenue collections. 
 
Trade openness.  Trade openness is an aggregated level of export and import 
calculated as a fraction of GDP.  Traditionally, trade taxes have been one of the key sources 
of revenue in the developing world.  The sector is more formalized and it is relatively easy to 
tax.  However, globalization and international competition have gradually led countries to 
reduce their reliance on trade taxes.  The governments, especially those in middle- and high-
income countries, are obligated to reduce tariffs at their borders over time.  A growing 
concern in developing countries is how to strengthen domestic revenue system to compensate 
for the expected losses in trade taxes.  However collections from the borders remain high, 
especially in low-income countries in Africa.  We expect to observe a positive relationship 
between trade openness and taxable capacity, but the strength of this correlation should be 
gradually decreased (Rodrik 1998). 
 
Agricultural value added.  Agricultural value added is measured as a fraction of GDP.  
Value added is the net output of the agricultural sector after adding up all outputs and 
subtracting intermediate inputs. Agriculture is one typical hard-to-tax sector; most 
developing countries exempt from taxes a large share of agricultural activities due to its 
inherent difficulty to collect the tax or due to equity and political reasons.  Thus a higher 
level of agricultural value added is expected to correlate with a lower level of taxable 
capacity. In addition, countries with a relatively larger share of agriculture in the economy 
generally have lower demand for public goods and services since most high-value public 
services are city-based (Tanzi 1992).   
  
Corruption index and bureaucratic quality.  The International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) provides alternatives for gauging the quality of the institutional setting of a country, 
particularly the corruption index and bureaucratic quality.  The ICRG staff collects political 
information and financial and economic data, converting these into points for each individual 
component on the basis of a consistent pattern of evaluation. The political risk assessments 
are made on the basis of subjective analysis of the available information and the assessments 
are conducted on an annual basis.
9  The corruption index measures the extent of corruption 
by assigning a numerical value to a country.  The index ranges from 1 to 6, where a higher 
number means lower corruption.   
 
The bureaucracy quality index is an alternative institutional indicator of governance.  
The index assesses political stability of a country and ranges from 1 to 4.  The higher scores 
are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the better strength and expertise to govern 
without having to resort to drastic and frequent changes in policy or to interruptions in 
government services (ICRG 2006).   To make the comparison of the regression results based 
on the use of these two alternative indicators and to facilitate our presentation of the 
institutional impact on tax effort, we follow Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), by rescaling the 
original ICRG corruption index and bureaucracy quality indicator to a range of -6 (least 
corrupt or best bureaucratic quality) and -1 (most corrupt or worst bureaucratic quality).  Our 
                                                 
9 http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx    
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hypothesis is that lower bureaucratic quality is correlated with lower taxable capacity, other 
things being equal.   
 
To ensure consistency, all data on tax-GDP and fiscal revenue-GDP ratios are taken from the 
same sources, WDI 2006.  It is worth noting that sub-national revenue data from either WDI 
or IMF Government Finance Statistics are largely missing, and due to the limitation of the 
statistics, the analysis covers only the tax and revenue collection at the central level.  The 
data tend to under record the tax level in countries with significant collection at the sub-
national levels, which Bird et al. (2004) has also cautioned about.  After checking outliers, 
we have excluded Kuwait and United Arab Emirates from the sample as these oil abundant 
countries appear to rely mostly on royalties and fees from natural resources. 
 
Annex 2 presents the statistics for all variables.  Annex 3 presents the period average of data 
by variable and country during 1994-2003.  Annex 4 summarizes the statistical correlation 
across variables.  It is observed that all the intended independent variables, GDP per capita, 
population growth rate, age dependency ratio, trade openness, agriculture value added, 
corruption index and bureaucratic quality indicator, have the predicted sign of correlation 
with either tax or revenue-GDP ratios.  In addition, all the correlations are sizable, ranging 
from 0.35 to more than 0.6 in absolute terms (Annex 4).   
 
Several considerations regarding the model specification should be mentioned. First, there 
are a number of institutional variables that have high correlation. For example, bureaucratic 
quality highly correlates with political stability and rule of law—leading to constraints in 
using a larger number of the institutional variables without the risk of multi-colinearity. 
Second, some of the institutional variables may be endogenous. For example, a conventional 
conjecture is that higher institutional quality may lead to higher taxes and revenues, and on 
the other hand, better tax and revenue performance may result in higher institutional quality.  
Bird et al (2006) test the presence of endogeneity problem, applying 2-Stage Least Squares 
(2SLS) approach and Hausman Chi-square test. The instrumental variables include ethnic 
fractionalization, language, and latitude. The Hausman Chi-square tests fail to detect the 
presence of simultaneity of the tax/revenue effort and institutional variables.  
 
Empirical Estimation of Tax and Total Fiscal Revenue Capacity 
 
The empirical results are presented in Tables 1 and 2 for taxable capacity and for fiscal 
revenue capacity, respectively.
10  Each table has two panels: panel A presents results of the 
specifications using population growth as proxy for the demographic influence on taxable 
capacity, and panel B replaces population growth with age-dependency ratios.  The 
regressions capture the entire period of 1994-2003 and the two sub-periods of 1994-1998 and 
1999-2003 to test the dynamics of tax and fiscal revenue capacity.  In each table, equation 1 
(the first column of the estimated coefficients) represents the regression on traditional tax 
                                                 
10 As previously defined, taxable capacity refers to the predicted tax-GDP ratio on the basis of a regression 
accounting for a country’s specific tax handles and quality of institutional setting, and the similar concept 
of (fiscal) revenue capacity refers to the predicted revenue-GDP ratio.   
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handles.  Equations 2 and 3 show results when institutional elements (corruption index and 
bureaucratic quality indicator) are respectively added on the right hand side.   
 
In Table 1, coefficients on the entire set of independent variables generally have predicted 
signs and are statistically significant.  The exception is the coefficients on GDP per capita in 
equations 1-3 (panel A) and equations 2-3 (panel B) for the period 1994-98, which are not 
statistically significant or have unpredicted sign (equation 3, panel A).  Table 2, Panel A, 
shows similar results:  the coefficients on GDP per capita are insignificant for equations 1-3 
for the sub-period 1994-98 and unpredicted sign in equations 2-3.  In Table 2, panel B, the 
coefficients on GDP per capita are, again, insignificant for the period 1994-98 but have 
predicted sign.  It is worth noting that while the coefficients on population growth are 
statistically significant and have predicted signs in all equations, the coefficients on age 
dependency ratio are generally insignificant, except for equations 2 and 3 for the 1999-2003, 
and have an unpredicted sign for equation 1 (period 1994-2003) and equations 1-3 (sub-
period 1994-98).   
 
In general, the results support the previous studies on the determinants of taxable and revenue 
capacity and particularly the recent empirical work by Bird et al. (2007), and Tanzi and 
Davoodi (1997).
11   A country with higher income level, lower population growth rate, more 
trade openness, lower agriculture share in GDP, and higher institutional quality is likely to 
have higher tax and revenue capacity.  The empirical results fit well to the statistics of the 
sample as summarized in the cross variable correlation (Annex 4).   
 
It is interesting to observe that in addition to the traditional tax collection determinants, 
corruption has highly statistically significant and sizable impact on both taxable and revenue 
capacity.  Particularly, the results in equation 2 (Tables 1 and 2) indicate that, (controlling for 
the level of income, demographic characteristics, trade openness, and agriculture) an increase 
in corruption by one-standard deviation (2.2) reduce the mean tax and revenue collection as a 
share of GDP by approximately 1.4 and 1.2 percentage points, or by 6.7 and 4.9 percent, 
respectively.   
 
 
                                                 
11 For an excellent review of the empirical results of other major studies on taxable capacity, see Bird et al. 
(2007).   
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Table 1:  Determinants of Taxable Capacity 
 
Panel A (population growth used as proxy for demographic characteristic) 
Tax/GDP 1994-2003  1994-1998  1999-2003 
  (Eq.  1)  (Eq. 2)  (Eq. 3)  (Eq.  1)  (Eq. 2)  (Eq. 3)  (Eq.  1)  (Eq. 2)  (Eq. 3) 
GDP  per  capita¹  2.273 2.171 2.051 0.094  0.146  -0.233  3.493 2.730 2.647 
   (8.06)**  (5.46)**  (5.15)**  (1.26)  (0.16) (0.25)  (8.08)** (4.79)** (5.00)** 
Population  Growth  -2.157 -2.662 -2.560 -2.525  -2.647  -2.753 -2.37  -2.903 -2.767 
    (8.60)** (10.64)**  (10.63)** (7.28)** (5.50)**  (5.75)** (6.40)**  (7.29)**  (7.50)** 
Trade  Openness  0.059 0.046 0.046 0.062  0.040  0.038  0.048 0.039 0.040 
   (9.11)**  (7.78)**  (7.70)** (5.23)**  (3.74)**  (3.64)**  (5.43)** (4.63)** (4.58)** 
Agriculture Value 
Added  -0.185 -0.129 -0.118 -0.196  -0.155 -0.154  -0.212  -0.141  -0.120 
   (9.18)**  (5.79)**  (5.28)** (6.75)**  (4.30)**  (4.34)**  (6.42)** (3.93)** (3.37)** 
Corruption    -0.612       -0.693       -0.694   
     (4.04)**       (2.61)**       (2.81)**   
Bureaucracy     -0.560      -0.638      -0.666 
       (4.59)**      (2.87)**     (3.60)** 
Constant  19.559 17.321 17.093 21.053  18.185 19.015  20.341  17.913  16.976 
    (22.65)** (15.84)** (15.71)** (12.96)** (7.72)** (9.25)** (16.82)** (11.38)** (10.58)** 
Observations  884 724 724 329  252  252  380 333 333 
R-squared  0.49 0.52 0.52 0.42  0.39  0.40  0.56 0.58 0.58 
  
 
Panel B (Age dependency ratio used as proxy for demographic characteristic) 
Tax/GDP 1994-2003  1994-1998  1999-2003 
  (Eq.  1)  (Eq. 2)  (Eq. 3)  (Eq.  1)  (Eq. 2)  (Eq. 3)  (Eq.  1)  (Eq. 2)  (Eq. 3) 
GDP  per  capita¹  3.037  2.731  2.614  1.621 1.343 1.402  3.535  2.680 2.620 
  (8.39)** (6.46)** (6.14)** (1.97)*  (1.37)  (1.50)  (7.57)**  (4.40)**  (4.33)** 
Age Dependency Ratio  -5.337  -8.593  -7.315  -6.859 -6.114 -5.815  -6.301 -12.680  -10.175 
  (2.75)** (4.34)** (3.80)** (2.11)*  (1.84)  (1.71)  (2.05)* (3.84)**  (3.24)** 
Trade  Openness  0.058  0.044  0.045  0.059 0.028 0.028  0.049  0.042 0.044 
  (7.80)** (6.21)** (6.22)**  (4.17)**  (2.30)* (2.23)* (4.84)**  (4.15)**  (4.12)** 
Agriculture Value 
Added -0.184  -0.134  -0.133  -0.163  -0.127 -0.134  -0.236  -0.142 -0.139 
  (7.60)**  (4.90)**  (4.91)**  (4.85)** (3.16)** (3.20)**  (5.79)**  (3.19)** (3.23)** 
Corruption     -0.451        -0.647       -0.693   
     (2.76)**        (2.18)*      (2.64)**  
Bureaucracy       -0.445       -0.429      -0.661 
       (3.37)**       (1.93)     (2.95)** 
Constant 20.055  19.967  18.963  21.310  18.109 19.341  21.808  22.291 20.158 
    (13.15)** (12.84)** (11.35)** (7.24)** (5.51)** (6.13)** (10.14)** (9.22)** (7.49)** 
Observations  868  724  724  323 252 252  374  333 333 
R-squared  0.41  0.44  0.44  0.30 0.29 0.28  0.50  0.52 0.52 
Robust t statistics in parentheses  
¹GDP per capita*10,000 
Note:  The dependent variable is Taxable capacity.  Estimation technique is OLS. 
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Table 2:  Determinants of Fiscal Revenue Capacity 
 
Panel A (population growth used as proxy for demographic characteristic) 
Revenue/GDP 1994-2003  1994-1998  1999-2003 
  (Eq.  1)  (Eq. 2)  (Eq. 3)  (Eq.  1)  (Eq. 2)  (Eq. 3)  (Eq.  1)  (Eq. 2)  (Eq. 3) 
GDP per capita¹  2.157 1.555 1.624 0.359  -0.510  -0.984 2.966 2.251 2.666 
   (5.39)**  (3.36)**  (3.48)**  (0.45)  (0.55) (1.01)  (6.00)** (3.47)** (4.33)** 
Population  Growth -1.246 -1.605 -1.504 -1.508  -1.590  -1.691 -1.635 -2.133 -2.054 
   (5.64)**  (6.65)**  (6.36)** (4.41)**  (3.16)**  (3.28)** (4.41)** (5.60)** (5.60)** 
Trade  Openness  0.070 0.057 0.057 0.077  0.051  0.050 0.054 0.046 0.047 
    (10.02)**  (9.26)** (9.08)** (5.83)**  (4.52)**  (4.41)** (5.69)** (5.12)** (4.96)** 
Agriculture Value 
Added  -0.285 -0.268 -0.264 -0.289  -0.298  -0.294 -0.309 -0.264 -0.266 
    (13.18)**  (11.97)**  (11.37)** (8.72)** (7.33)** (7.28)**  (9.51)**  (8.26)**  (8.12)** 
Corruption    -0.545       -0.545       -0.603   
     (3.29)**       (1.90)      (2.25)*  
Bureaucracy     -0.392      -0.587     -0.260 
       (3.27)**      (2.79)**     (1.41) 
Constant  23.278 21.704 22.079 24.332  23.236  23.501 24.337 22.434 23.449 
    (24.92)** (18.93)** (20.50)** (13.82)** (9.06)** (11.27)** (19.05)** (13.62)** (15.30)** 
Observations  886 725 725 330  252  252 381 334 334 
R-squared  0.47 0.50 0.50 0.41  0.39  0.39 0.54 0.57 0.57 
  
 
Panel B (Age dependency ratio used as proxy for demographic characteristic) 
Revenue/GDP  1994-2003 1994-1998 1999-2003 
  (Eq.  1)  (Eq. 2)  (Eq. 3)  (Eq.  1)  (Eq. 2)  (Eq. 3)  (Eq.  1)  (Eq. 2)  (Eq. 3) 
GDP per capita¹  2.488  2.094  1.970  1.098 0.559 0.233  2.984  2.286  2.523 
  (6.14)**  (4.37)**  (4.17)**  (1.31) (0.57) (0.25)  (5.92)**  (3.37)**  (3.82)** 
Age Dependency Ratio  1.488  -1.200  -0.224  0.830  0.407  0.725  -2.061  -7.569  -6.309 
  (0.75)  (0.57)  (0.11)  (0.24) (0.11) (0.19)  (0.77) (2.70)**  (2.25)* 
Trade  Openness  0.066  0.055  0.055  0.071 0.042 0.041  0.051  0.047  0.048 
  (9.01)**  (8.13)**  (8.11)**  (5.13)** (3.66)** (3.54)**  (5.09)**  (4.70)**  (4.62)** 
Agriculture Value 
Added -0.315  -0.310  -0.308  -0.290  -0.309 -0.307  -0.345  -0.289  -0.294 
  (12.68)** (10.36)** (10.39)** (7.92)** (6.22)** (6.08)** (10.25)**  (7.65)**  (7.84)** 
Corruption     -0.336        -0.454       -0.490   
     (1.95)        (1.50)       (1.79)   
Bureaucracy       -0.357       -0.494      -0.283 
       (2.95)**      (2.56)*      (1.35) 
Constant 21.214  21.874  20.963  21.525  21.217 21.062  24.658  25.693  25.489 
    (13.72)** (14.94)** (13.52)** (7.13)** (6.71)** (6.93)** (12.23)** (11.94)** (10.58)** 
Observations  871  726  726  324 252 252  375  334  334 
R-squared  0.44  0.48  0.48  0.36 0.36 0.36  0.52  0.54  0.54 
Robust t statistics in parentheses  
¹GDP per capita*10,000 
Note:  The dependent variable is Taxable capacity.  Estimation technique is OLS. 
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Estimation of Tax Effort Indexes and Policy Implications 
 
To capture the direct impact of corruption, we select equation 2 (in Tables 1 and 2, panel A) 
for the estimation of the tax capacity and total fiscal revenue capacity.  (Note corruption 
index is used as proxy for institutional quality, but bureaucratic quality is excluded from 
equation 2.)  The index of tax effort is calculated by dividing the actual tax-GDP ratio by the 
taxable capacity, and the results are shown in Annexes 5-6.  In general, countries’ tax efforts 
are relatively stable over the two sub-periods 1994-98 and 1999-2003, except for some 
countries, specifically, Costa Rica, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Moldova, Nicaragua, and 
Vietnam.  Interestingly, all the three developed countries in the sample (Denmark, Germany, 
and Iceland) have lowered their tax efforts in the second sub-period. 
 
Similar to the findings in Chelliah et al. (1975), and Stosky and WoldeMariam (1997), the 
predicted tax efforts are positively correlated with the actual collection:  higher collection 
tends to be associated with higher tax effort.  The correlation between the two is estimated to 
be greater than 0.65 for the period of 1994-2003.  A possible conjecture is that countries with 
higher collection tend to exhibit their above-average tax effort (Chelliah, et al. 1975).  This 
implies that tax effort and actual tax-GDP ratios can be used as compliments in measuring 
tax performance across countries.  However, one should also observe a number of exceptions, 
notably Uganda and Ethiopia with low collection but high effort, and Estonia, Latvia, Ireland, 
and Switzerland with high collection and low effort.   
 
 




























0 10 20 30 40
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Figure 3 depicts the relation between actual collection and the predicted taxable capacity 
during 1994-2003.  The 45 degree line represents countries with the unitary tax effort, along 
which tax collection exactly equals the predicted taxable capacity.  Countries located above   
  - 14 -
the line are those with tax efforts greater than 1 (high tax efforts), and below the line are 
those with tax efforts less than 1 (low tax efforts).  Let’s use 1 as the benchmark for tax effort 
and 19 percent (the median of the tax-GDP ratios in the country sample) for actual tax 
collection.  A country is regarded as a low-collection country if its actual collection is lower 
than the median of 19 percent, and regarded as a high-collection country if its collection is 
above the median threshold.  The use of tax effort and actual tax collection benchmarks 
allows us to rank countries into four different groups: (i) low tax collection, low tax effort; (ii) 
high tax collection, high tax effort; (iii) low tax collection, high tax effort; and, (iv) high tax 
collection, low tax effort.  Consistent to our observation that tax effort is positively correlated 
with actual collection, the majority of countries clusters in the first two groups (low tax 
collection and low tax effort; or high tax collection and high tax effort).  Table 3 provides a 
list of the countries in the four different groups.  
 
We argue that while taxation is always a critical dimension of fiscal policy for all countries, 
countries at various stages of development and with different initial levels of tax collection 
and effort should rely on different strategies for tax reforms.  Our analysis focuses on tax 
performance and broad directions for reforms in developing countries.  A caution should be 
emphasized again in interpreting our broad country classification by tax effort and tax 
collection and subsequent comments.  They serve as complimentary but not substituting for 
detailed analysis of a country’s specific fiscal policies and its path on taxation reforms.  As 
previously highlighted, there are unavoidable potential caveats in empirical work and in 
estimation of a country’s taxable capacity.  The later is essentially based on comparison with 
the sample’s average performer, which may not necessarily be relevant to the specific 
country under consideration.  Different countries may have different sets of fiscal preferences 
regarding relative size of government and pressing needs to rely on taxation to finance public 
expenditures.  
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    Table 3: List of Countries according to Tax Efforts and Tax Collections Level 
 
   TAX EFFORT 
   LOW  HIGH 
LOW 
Developing Countries  Developed Countries 
Albania   Dominican   Nicaragua   Korea, Rep 
Argentina   Ecuador   Oman   United States  
Armenia   El Salvador   Panama    
Azerbaijan   Guatemala   Paraguay    
Bahrain   India   Peru    
Bangladesh   Indonesia   Philippines    
Botswana   Iran  Sierra Leone   
Cameroon   Kazakhstan   Sri Lanka    
Chile   Lebanon   Sudan    
China   Madagascar   Thailand    
Colombia   Malaysia   Venezuela    
Congo, DR  Mexico   Yemen   
Congo, Rep         
Developing Countries  Developed Countries 
Bolivia  

































    
Developing Countries  Developed Countries 
Algeria Namibia  Austria  Norway 
Belarus PNG  Belgium  Portugal 
Brazil Poland  Cyprus  Slovenia 
Bulgaria Russian  Fed  Denmark  Spain 
Croatia Slovak  Rep  Finland  Sweden 
Czech Rep  South Africa  France  UK 
Egypt Tunisia  Greece   
Hungary Uruguay  Italy   
Jamaica Yugoslavia  Morocco   
Jordan Zimbabwe  Netherlands   
Mongolia   New  Zealand    
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Group 1:  Low Collection and Low Effort 
 
Countries listed in this group share some critical similarities.  Except for the two high-income 
countries (Korea and the United States), all others are from the developing world, of which 
three fourths are ranked in low-income or lower-middle-income countries (as defined by the 
World Bank).  Some of the countries (for example, Cameroon and Madagascar) are heavily 
aid dependent.  The majority of the developing countries in this group have numerous 
problems in both tax policy and tax administration.  Some countries (e.g., Cameroon, 
Madagascar, the Philippines, and India) have their tax policies riddled with overly complex 
structures and multiple—largely ad-hoc—incentives that narrow the already limited tax base, 
create more loopholes for tax avoidance and evasion, intensify the public perception of 
unfairness of taxes, and generate opportunity for corruption.  In response to the challenge of 
increasing capital mobility and deepening globalization, some countries (e.g., India and 
Cameroon) choose to retain generous tax incentives to compensate for their relatively high 
statutory rates on corporate income.  Such complex tax regimes combined with the existing 
weak revenue administration capacity have led to chronic low tax collection at high 
administrative and compliance costs.   
 
Given this existing tax system, an improvement in tax collection would require that these low 
and lower-middle-income countries undertake comprehensive reforms of both tax policy and 
tax administration.  Revenue enhancement should be one of the key objectives for the 
reforms as long as it is compatible with efficiency and equity criteria.  In tax policy, they 
particularly need to broaden the base, rationalize the rate structure and incentive schemes, 
and remove tax-induced economic distortions with focus on enhancing revenue productivity 
of major taxes, particularly the broad-based consumption VAT.   
 
 
Group 2:  High Collection and High Effort 
 
Included in this group typically are middle and high-income countries.  For these countries, 
there appears relatively little scope for further enhancing revenue collection without 
generating disproportionately high economic costs.   
 
It is worth noting that the initial condition of high collection and high tax effort in a number 
of developing countries does not necessarily mean their tax structures or administrations  
could be regarded as conforming to international best practices.  In reality tax regimes in 
many countries remain highly complex and inefficient.  For example, in Brazil, the 
complexity of the coexistence of both federal VAT (IPI) and state VAT (ICMS) is further 
aggravated by multiple rate structure (with 24 positive rates effective at the current stage), 
numerous exemptions and special VAT regimes, which have triggered pervasive inter-state 
competition.  In all of these countries, widespread deductions, exemptions, and other 
incentives are also granted in major direct income taxes (PIT, CIT).   
 
Revenue enhancement should not be the key objective of tax reforms in these countries with 
already high level of collection and high tax effort.  Instead, revenue neutrality or even lower 
overall tax burden in some countries with excessively high tax rates may be strategically 
sought.  Reform activities should primarily aim to enhance the economic efficiency of    
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existing taxes, reduce tax-induced distortions and improve the business climate through 
further rationalizing the tax regimes, rebalancing the tax mix, and simplifying the 
administration procedures.   
 
 
Group 3:  Low Collection and High Effort 
 
Listed in this group are only a small number of countries, the majority of which 
(approximately 80 percent) are still at their early stage of development.
12  In the low-income 
countries, administration capacity is notably low and the tax regime is highly unstable.  They 
have low collections, whereas high tax efforts are usually achieved by either enforcing easy 
taxes (particular trade taxes) or imposing high taxes on the formal sector, or both.  Uganda is 
the case in point.  The country’s tax system represents a combination of multiple contrasts:  
relatively high tax effort, low collection, and taxation being considered as a significant 
impediment to investment and formality (Chen, et al. 2001).  Revenue collection has 
stagnated at about 12 percent since the early 2000s.  The recent tax policy reform strategies 
have been largely inconsistent:  an increase of statutory rates in some major taxes was 
blended with introduction of new exemptions and zero rates in the VAT.  In addition, Uganda, 
being a land-locked country, still relies heavily on distorting trade taxes; and a high tax 
burden is being imposed on a limited number of taxpayers, and medium sized firms which 
already bear disproportionately high share of taxes (Gauthier, et al. 2006).  Short-term tax 
reform measures should aim at streamlining tax policy and tax administration procedures to 
reduce compliance costs and encourage formality, and to lower tax barriers to firms’ entry 
and operations.  Medium to long term reform priorities are to expand the scope for raising 




Group 4:  High Collection, Low Effort 
 
Of the total 13 countries listed in this group, about 77 percent are from the rank of upper-
middle-income and above.  Six are developed countries, and four—upper-middle-income 
countries.  Of the ECA countries, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are part of the EU-8, and 
Romania just joined the EU from the beginning of 2007. Ukraine with a robust increase in 
revenue collection in 2005 to 35 percent has apparently shifted to the group of countries with 
high collection, high effort (group 2).  These countries demonstrate that they have high 
revenue potential and that their existing high level of tax collection but low effort may reflect 
their choice of the level of taxation.   
 
A close look at the experience of the ECA countries in this group reveals that with the 
already high level of collection, they need to consider restructuring their tax mix, particularly 
reducing the excessive burden on production factors and shifting toward taxation of broad-
based consumption sources.  These countries typically impose high factor income taxes, 
specifically taxes on labor.  The tax wedge on labor, defined as the ratio of the total taxes 
                                                 
12 The tax-GDP ratio was about 20 percent in Kenya in 2005, while it was approximately 24 percent in 
Turkey in 2006.  With the recent surge in tax collection in these two countries, both Kenya and Turkey 
appear to have shifted to the group of countries with high collection and high effort (group 2).  .    
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(income taxes and social security contributions) over wages plus employer’s social security 
contributions, in EU-8 and Romania is on average greater than 45 percent, which is probably 
highest in the world (for comparison, the average rate in OECD countries is around 40 
percent) (Rutkowski, et al. 2005).   
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 
Finding a composite index for measuring and benchmarking performance in taxation is both 
theoretically and practically challenging.  The use of a tax effort index which relates the 
actual tax collection of a country to its estimated taxable capacity is tempting because it takes 
into account the country’s specific fiscal, demographic, and institutional characteristics as 
compared to its peers and hence provides a fuller picture of the country’s tax performance in 
comparative terms.  However due to certain potential caveats in the modeling of taxable 
capacity and in the measurement of the actual tax-GDP ratio itself, the results need to be 
interpreted with care and be complimentary to but not substituting detailed analysis of a 
country’s tax system. Such analysis should cover the contexts of the country’s overall fiscal 
policy, and particularly the demand for and composition of public expenditures at a particular 
stage of development.   
 
The paper lends support to the suggestions in the available literature that developing 
countries have limitations to expand the scope for taxation, efficiently and equitably, which is 
in turn dependent on the underlying taxable capacity and the country’s initial level of tax 
collection. While taxation is the best reliable alternative to finance public spending in the 
long run, developing countries generally experience a chronic gap between the level of 
revenues and the desirable level of public funds.  The structural issues related to taxation 
indicate that all countries have to adopt a long term vision for taxation reforms, and specific 
strategies for reforms cannot be “one size fits all.”  For example, countries with low level of 
actual collection and low tax effort may have ample scope for raising revenues to reach their 
potential without aggravating economic distortions within the medium term.  In contrast, a 
few low-income countries, trapped in the situation of relatively low collection and high tax 
effort, have limited short-term scope to enhance revenue without inducing high collection 
(both compliance and administration) costs and creating negative incentives for the formal 
sector.   
 
Finally, in addition to structural factors, the politics of taxation is critically important in 
revenue reforms in all countries at vastly different levels of development.  As Lora et al. 
(2006) emphasize, taxation is highly path-dependent due to resistance of the elites; and in 
addition, the wide-reaching effects of taxation as well as the common pool nature of tax 
revenues make it difficult to reach the cooperative solutions on establishing simple, efficient 
and equitable tax systems.  It is politically, and hence practically challenging, to make 
fundamental changes to an established tax structure.  Hence, the success of any tax revenue 
reform is highly dependent, inter alia, on the top political commitments.  The discussion on 
revenue reforms must be country specific and reliant on comprehensive analysis of the 
country’s revenue potential, revenue performance, and political readiness to difficult reform 
measures. 
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Annex 1: Matrix of Correlation Coefficients, 1994-2003 
  it Y (Tax/GDP)  it Y (Rev/GDP)  it GDP   it POP  
 
it AGE   it TRADE   it AGR  
 
it CORR   it BUREAU  
it Y (Tax/GDP)  1               
it Y (Rev/GDP)  0.9005 1              
it GDP   0.5593  0.5212  1          
it POP   -0.5198  -0.4113  -0.3427  1         
it AGE   -0.4848 -0.4430  -0.4805  0.7638  1         
it TRADE   0.3497 0.4013  0.1765  -0.1148  -0.2416  1      
it AGR   -0.5373 -0.6051  -0.5586  0.3697  0.6398  -0.2935  1     
it CORR   -0.4292 -0.4209  -0.6278  0.1333  0.2679  -0.1337  0.4438  1   
it BUREAU   -0.5155 -0.4888  -0.7236  0.2628  0.4732  -0.1643  0.563  0.0617  1 
Note: Number of observations 724.  Number of countries 104.    
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Annex 2 : Period Average of Data by Variable and Country, 1994-2003* 
Country  it Y (Tax/GDP)  it Y (Rev/GDP)  it GDP   it POP   it TRADE   it AGR   it CORR   it BUREAU  
Albania 14.6  18.6  1,067.2  -0.4  59.0  36.7  -4.4  -3.1 
Algeria 30.3  32.6  1,734.4  1.7  54.9  10.8  -3.8  -4.0 
Argentina 15.0  16.5  7,391.5  1.2  25.0  6.7  -4.5  -6.5 
Armenia 17.3  18.9  597.3  -1.1  85.4  33.0  -2.9  -2.5 
Australia 23.5  26.0  19,529.3  1.2  40.6  3.5  -8.2  -10.0 
Austria 35.5  37.9  22,665.0  0.4  81.2  2.4  -7.8  -10.0 
Azerbaijan 17.3  18.0  677.3  1.0  100.7  21.4  -3.3  -2.5 
Bahrain 7.0  28.0  11,754.0  2.6  151.7  0.9  -5.0  -5.7 
Bangladesh 7.9  10.0  334.9  2.1  30.3  25.1  -2.8  -3.8 
Belarus 29.0  30.5  1,227.7  -0.3  129.2  14.9  -4.6  -2.5 
Belgium 42.1  43.4  20,953.5  0.3  147.7  1.6  -6.7  -10.0 
Belize  19.5  21.9  3,147.0 2.9  111.8 17.0 …  … 
Bhutan  7.2  18.1  566.4 2.9  76.2 37.7 …  … 
Bolivia 15.4  19.1  979.6  2.1  49.3  15.8  -4.3  -3.7 
Bosnia  And  Herzegovina  36.9  42.0  1,002.1 -0.5  92.2 18.3 …  … 
Botswana 20.6  44.8  2,810.7  1.4  89.1  3.6  -5.1  -5.0 
Brazil 19.1  24.6  3,360.6  1.5  22.1  8.5  -5.0  -6.0 
Bulgaria 27.1  34.3  1,574.9  -0.8  104.9  14.9  -5.6  -5.0 
Burundi  15.6  17.5  113.5 1.8  30.9 51.1 …  … 
Cambodia  8.4  10.5  265.3 2.4  89.5 41.8 …  … 
Cameroon 9.8  13.7  585.1  2.2  48.3  40.4  -4.0  -4.5 
Canada 19.3  20.9  21,558.5  1.0  74.5  2.7  -9.3  -10.0 
Chile 17.7  21.5  4,636.8  1.4  59.9  6.3  -5.9  -6.7 
China 5.8  6.2  852.2  0.9  45.5  16.9  -4.0  -5.3 
Colombia 13.2  17.6  2,023.1  1.8  37.8  13.7  -4.2  -5.9 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  4.1  4.9  104.4  2.7  42.6  52.7  -1.2  -1.0 
Congo, Rep.  9.9  31.7  968.0  3.2  126.7  8.5  -5.1  -2.5 
Costa Rica  18.9  20.9  3,830.2  2.3  87.1  11.3  -7.1  -5.1 
Cote D'Ivoire  17.5  18.2  612.7  2.4  73.3  24.9  -4.8  -3.9    
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Croatia 39.0  41.3  3,928.5  -0.1  98.1  10.4  -4.6  -6.9 
Cyprus 24.6  30.7  10,984.7  1.4  97.2  5.5  -7.4  -9.5 
Czech Republic  30.8  32.1  5,270.2 -0.1  117.8  4.2 -6.2  -7.5 
Denmark 33.0  37.0  28,005.7  0.4  73.0  3.1  -9.7  -10.0 
Dominican Republic  15.3  16.5  2,098.2  1.5  85.1  12.0  -5.1  -3.5 
Ecuador 14.4  15.3  1,348.4  1.7  55.5  12.8  -4.9  -5.0 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  20.0  32.2  1,405.3  1.9  47.1  16.7  -3.9  -5.0 
El Salvador  13.3  15.6  2,009.0  2.0  61.9  12.3  -5.2  -3.5 
Estonia 27.0  29.4  3,705.0  -1.1  152.5  7.1  -6.5  -6.8 
Ethiopia 14.0  18.5  97.0  2.1  40.2  51.2  -3.3  -1.9 
Fiji  21.8  25.2  2,049.4 1.1  118.3 18.0 …  … 
Finland 35.7  40.0  21,156.4  0.3  66.6  4.2  -10.0  -9.9 
France 40.8  43.7  21,263.6  0.4  48.5  3.0  -6.6  -9.1 
Georgia  10.1  11.5  626.2 -1.4  78.8 34.6 …  … 
Germany 28.6  29.9  22,050.9  0.2  57.1  1.2  -8.3  -10.0 
Ghana 16.9  18.3  243.3  2.4  80.6  37.5  -4.3  -6.0 
Greece 39.3  46.4  9,884.2 0.6  48.4  8.6 -7.1  -7.5 
Guatemala 9.3  9.7  1,648.2  2.3  44.9  23.5  -4.4  -3.6 
Guinea 12.0  13.4  356.0  2.7  47.9  23.6  -5.5  -4.0 
Hungary 34.8  38.0  4,289.1  -0.2  109.8  5.7  -7.2  -9.0 
Iceland 29.3  33.9  27,452.0  1.0  73.5  10.7  -9.5  -10.0 
India 9.1  12.0  420.7  1.7  26.0  26.7  -4.3  -7.5 
Indonesia 14.6  17.6  815.4  1.4  60.4  16.9  -3.1  -5.3 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  9.3  23.6  1,570.7  1.5  43.0  15.9  -5.4  -5.6 
Ireland 24.8  26.4  21,208.9  1.1  150.4  5.4  -6.1  -10.0 
Italy 36.3  38.3  17,861.4  0.1  48.8  3.1  -5.2  -7.6 
Jamaica 25.8  32.0  3,163.6  0.7  99.6  7.4  -4.0  -7.1 
Japan 17.3  20.6  36,564.6  0.2  19.0  1.7  -6.4  -9.9 
Jordan 19.7  26.4  1,743.0  3.3  118.5  3.8  -5.9  -5.6 
Kazakhstan 11.5  12.5 1,282.1  -0.7 90.5  12.3  -3.5  -5.0    
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Kenya 18.9  21.3  419.6  2.5  56.6  30.4  -4.1  -6.0 
Korea, Rep.  16.3  19.2  10,102.7  0.8  67.2  5.4  -6.2  -8.0 
Kyrgyz  Republic  13.4  15.7  280.8 1.0  84.2 40.1 …  … 
Latvia 23.7  27.0  3,047.8  -1.1  103.1  7.0  -4.1  -5.7 
Lebanon 14.1  18.3  4,881.3  1.8  64.0  8.5  -2.8  -4.0 
Lesotho  37.7  45.5  476.7 0.8  140.8 17.9 …  … 
Lithuania 25.0  27.2  3,208.4  -0.6  107.9  9.9  -4.6  -5.7 
Luxembourg 38.6  41.5  39,788.3  1.2  238.6  0.9  -8.9  -10.0 
Madagascar 8.5  12.7  232.3  2.9  53.7  28.8  -6.6  -2.5 
Malaysia 18.3  24.2  3,677.2  2.4  196.6  11.3  -5.5  -6.8 
Malta 27.6  33.4  8,724.7  0.8  184.3  3.1  -6.2  -7.0 
Mauritius 18.8  21.7  3,492.5  1.1  123.8  8.5  …  … 
Mexico 12.9  14.7  5,496.1  1.6  54.7  5.1  -4.3  -6.5 
Moldova 22.1  26.3  356.4  -0.3  113.4  29.9  -2.9  -4.5 
Mongolia 28.5  37.9  372.3  1.2  129.1  32.5  -5.4  -5.0 
Morocco 25.3  28.6  1,195.7  1.5  63.2  16.0  -4.9  -5.0 
Namibia 29.1  32.2  1,800.3  2.5  103.5  11.0  -5.3  -6.5 
Nepal  8.5  10.4  212.4 2.3  52.4 41.4 …  … 
Netherlands 38.5  41.3  21,564.0  0.6  114.7  3.2  -9.5  -10.0 
New Zealand  30.1  35.3  13,102.8  1.2  60.9  7.9  -9.1  -10.0 
Nicaragua 16.7  18.6  742.4  2.2  68.4  23.7  -6.5  -2.5 
Norway 37.4  48.2  34,830.9  0.6  71.7  2.5  -8.9  -9.8 
Oman 7.2  26.9  8,080.1  2.2  87.8  2.4  -4.7  -6.0 
Pakistan 12.0  15.8  521.1  2.4  34.1  25.4  -3.4  -5.0 
Panama 16.0  24.2  3,733.2  2.0  159.7  7.6  -3.3  -4.2 
Papua New Guinea  21.5  23.9  655.3  2.4  107.4  28.7  -3.9  -6.0 
Paraguay 11.1  15.5  1,455.6  2.5  72.1  24.1  -3.0  -3.5 
Peru 14.7  16.8  1,978.9  1.7  32.3  9.6  -4.8  -4.0 
Philippines 14.8  16.6  965.6  2.0  93.5  17.9  -4.4  -5.7 
Poland 29.3  33.0  3,890.7  0.0  56.0  4.8  -6.3  -7.6    
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Portugal 33.5  37.4  9,588.3  0.4  67.5  4.6  -7.5  -7.5 
Romania 22.5  25.8  1,745.6  -0.5  66.0  17.3  -5.1  -2.5 
Russian Federation  22.7  28.9  1,818.1  -0.3  62.4  6.6  -3.4  -3.5 
Rwanda  9.2  10.6  234.8 2.0  34.4 42.0 …  … 
Senegal 16.4  17.3  412.0  2.5  66.9  18.9  -4.8  -3.5 
Seychelles 35.4  44.3  6,792.4  1.3  145.3  3.3  …  … 
Sierra Leone  9.3  9.7  173.0  2.0  48.7  50.2  -3.5  -0.2 
Slovak Republic  30.7  35.2  3,575.9  0.1  134.8  4.8  -5.9  -7.7 
Slovenia 36.7  39.0  8,823.0  0.0  112.2  4.0  -5.8  -7.5 
South Africa  25.3  26.8  3,030.0  1.8  49.1  3.8  -6.1  -6.7 
Spain 25.9  28.6  13,444.8  0.7  50.1  4.9  -7.0  -8.3 
Sri Lanka  16.2  18.3  783.8  0.9  79.7  21.6  -5.6  -5.0 
St. Kitts And Nevis  24.6  31.5  6,915.5  0.9  120.9  4.6  …  … 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines  23.8  28.6  2,781.4  0.6  117.6  11.7  …  … 
Sudan 6.2  7.5  349.6  2.2  29.7  41.0  -2.2  -2.5 
Swaziland  26.0  27.4  1,324.1 2.6  173.5 14.9 …  … 
Sweden 35.2  39.6  25,078.9  0.3  74.8  2.3  -9.6  -10.0 
Switzerland 19.5  22.2  32,926.5  0.6  74.4  1.9  -8.6  -10.0 
Syria 17.3  22.9  1,100.2  2.6  67.5  26.5  -5.2  -3.5 
Tajikistan  10.3  11.3  188.2 1.3  120.1 28.6 …  … 
Thailand 16.5  19.5  2,012.2  1.1  103.8  9.7  -3.8  -6.4 
Trinidad And Tobago  23.1  27.1  5,935.3  0.5  94.5  1.8  -4.6  -6.5 
Tunisia 25.5  29.7  1,906.0  1.4  90.9  12.8  -4.5  -5.0 
Turkey 15.7  19.3  2,822.5  1.7  50.7  15.3  -4.6  -6.0 
Uganda 11.1  11.4  227.4  3.2  34.4  41.4  -3.9  -4.0 
Ukraine 23.1  27.8  751.4  -0.7  92.2  15.6  -3.1  -2.5 
United Kingdom  35.5  37.0  22,876.3  0.3  55.0  1.4  -8.0  -10.0 
United States  17.7  18.3  32,420.3  1.1  23.4  1.5  -7.5  -10.0 
Uruguay 25.6  28.1  5,890.9  0.7  41.7  7.9  -5.0  -4.3 
Vanuatu  19.4  22.3  1,255.2 2.3  101.3 15.9 …  …    
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Venezuela 14.0  20.3  4,886.1  2.0  50.1  4.9  -4.3  -3.5 
Vietnam 17.3  21.2  365.8  1.5  98.9  26.0  -3.7  -4.5 
Yemen, Rep.  10.0  22.8  502.2  3.6  81.2  17.7  -4.4  -3.5 
Yugoslavia 33.3  35.8  969.9  -1.9  62.7  19.0  -3.6  -5.0 
Zambia 17.7  19.2  315.3  2.2  63.8  21.8  -4.9  -2.5 
Zimbabwe 23.5  25.7  588.0  1.3  66.1  17.0  -3.2  -5.9 
* Note:  (…) denotes missing variables.  A country sample without institutional quality variables is 126, and country sample with institutional quality variables 
is 104. 
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Annex 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Mean  Min  Max  SD  N 
Tax Effort  20.06  2.33  43.53  9.59  982 
Revenue Effort  24.41  2.94  51.17  10.09  984 
GDP per capita  5,487.21  56.62  48,419.30  8,413.47  2,305 
Population Growth  1.45  -26.70  18.71  1.55  2,539 
Trade Openness  
(Export + Import)/GDP  84.64 1.53  376.22  46.05  2,233 
Agricultural Value Added/GDP  17.91  0.07  93.98  14.86  2,161 
Bureaucratic Quality  -5.49  -10.00  0.00  2.91  1,866 
Corruption Index  -5.08  -10.00  0.00  2.20  1,866 
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Annex 4: Variable Descriptions and Sources 
 
Variables Description  Source 
Tax collection 
(Tax/GDP) 
(Average 1994-2003).  Tax revenue refers to compulsory 
transfers to the central government for public purposes.  




(Average 1994-2003).  Revenue is cash receipts from 
taxes, social contributions, and other revenues such as 
fines, fees, rent, and income from property or sales. Grants 
are also considered as revenue but are excluded here.  
WDI (2006) 
GDP per capita  (Average 1994-2003).  GDP per capita is gross domestic 
product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of 
gross value added by all resident producers in the 
economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies 
not included in the value of the products.  Data are in 
constant U.S. dollars.   
WDI (2006) 
Population Growth  (Average 1994-2003).  Total population between the ages 
15 to 64 is the number of people who could potentially be 
economically active.   
WDI (2006) 
Age Dependency Ratio  (Average 1994-2003).  Age dependency ratio is the ratio 
of dependents--people younger than 15 or older than 64--
to the working-age population--those ages 15-64. For 
example, 0.7 means there are 7 dependents for every 10 
working-age people.   
WDI (2006) 
Trade Openness 
(Export + Import)/GDP 
(Average 1994-2003).  Trade is the sum of exports and 
imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross 




(Average 1994-2003).  Agriculture corresponds to ISIC 
divisions 1-5 and includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, 
as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production. 
Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up 
all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is 
calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural 
resources. 
WDI (2006) 
Bureaucratic Quality  (Average 1994-2003).  The institutional strength and 
quality of the bureaucracy is a shock absorber that tends to 
minimize revisions of policy when governments change.  
The original score ranges from 1 to 4.  High points are 
given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength 
and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy 
or interruptions in government services.  The score is 
recalculated to -10 to -1 where low points are countries 
with strength bureaucracy and high points are countries 
with weak bureaucracy. 
ICRG (2006) 
Corruption Index  (Average 1994-2003).  The assessment of corruption 
refers to the political system.  Corruption index ranges 
from 1 to 6.  High points are given to low corruption 
countries and low points are given to high corruption 
countries.  The scores are recalculated to -10 to -1 where 
low points mean low corruption and high points mean 
high corruption. 
ICRG (2006)    
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Annex 5: Actual vs. Predicted Tax Capacity 
 














Albania 14.60  19.89  0.74    Albania 14.60  19.89  0.74    Algeria  32.36  17.13  1.89 
Algeria 30.30  16.92  1.79    Algeria 28.65  16.75  1.71    Argentina  13.95  18.88  0.74 
Argentina  13.95  18.88 0.74    Austria  35.24  29.42 1.20    Armenia  16.40  21.06 0.78 
Armenia  16.40  21.06 0.78    Azerbaijan  16.80  18.05 0.93    Australia  23.41  24.99 0.94 
Australia  23.41  24.99 0.94    Bahrain  7.35  21.96 0.33    Austria  35.55  30.10 1.18 
Austria  35.50  29.99 1.18    Belarus  27.08  26.76 1.01    Azerbaijan  16.54  17.88 0.93 
Azerbaijan  16.67  17.96 0.93    Belgium  42.51  30.85 1.38    Bangladesh  7.79  12.21 0.64 
Bahrain  7.35  21.96 0.33    Botswana  17.08  18.55 0.92    Belarus  26.65  26.02 1.02 
Bangladesh  7.79  12.21 0.64    Brazil  20.18  16.84 1.20    Belgium  42.06  32.18 1.31 
Belarus  26.72  26.15 1.02    Bulgaria  26.55  25.33 1.05    Bolivia  14.80  14.61 1.01 
Belgium  42.13  31.96 1.32    Cameroon  8.94  10.45 0.86    Bulgaria  26.93  26.62 1.02 
Bolivia  14.80  14.61 1.01    Canada  19.36  28.34 0.68    Canada  19.83  29.51 0.67 
Botswana  17.08  18.55 0.92    China  5.25  16.98 0.31    Chile  17.87  21.60 0.83 
Brazil  20.18  16.84 1.20    Congo,  Dem  Rep 4.35  7.11 0.71    China  7.49  17.29 0.43 
Bulgaria  26.74  25.97 1.03    Costa  Rica  18.26  18.73 0.98    Colombia  12.96  16.32 0.79 
Cameroon  8.94  10.45 0.86    Cote  D'Ivoire  18.69  13.32 1.40    Congo,  Dem  Rep 4.36  6.42 0.71 
Canada  19.54  28.78 0.68    Croatia  43.53  27.15 1.60    Congo,  Rep.  9.92  17.72 0.56 
Chile  17.87  21.60 0.83    Cyprus  25.48  24.31 1.05    Costa  Rica  19.79  19.57 1.01 
China  6.37  17.13 0.37    Denmark  34.25  31.54 1.09    Cote  D'Ivoire  16.37  15.53 1.06 
Colombia  12.96  16.32 0.79    Dominican    15.00  19.35 0.78    Croatia  39.28  25.29 1.61 
Congo, Dem Rep  4.35  6.80  0.71  Ecuador  12.40 15.55  0.80    Czech  Republic 30.85  27.94  1.11 
Congo,  Rep.  9.92  17.72 0.56    Egypt  19.23  15.69 1.22    Denmark  32.82  32.02 1.03 
Costa  Rica  19.02  19.15 0.99    Estonia  28.03  32.35 0.87    Dominican  Rep  15.73  19.99 0.79 
Cote  D'Ivoire  17.53  14.43 1.23    Finland  35.86  30.07 1.19    El  Salvador  13.30  17.38 0.77 
Croatia  39.99  25.60 1.61    France  40.49  27.00 1.50    Estonia  25.67  31.45 0.82 
Cyprus  25.48  24.31 1.05    Germany  28.71  29.24 0.98    Ethiopia  14.04  10.45 1.34 
Czech Republic  30.85  27.94  1.11  Greece  38.36  24.18 1.59    Finland  35.89 30.65 1.17 
Denmark  33.06  31.94 1.04    Guatemala  8.41  13.59 0.62    France  40.99  25.95 1.58 
Dominican  Rep  15.37  19.67 0.78    Iceland  28.40  29.70 0.96    Germany  28.76  29.16 0.99 
Ecuador  12.40  15.55 0.80    India  9.06  13.11 0.69    Ghana  18.30  14.20 1.29 
Egypt 19.23  15.69  1.22    Indonesia 15.80  16.99 0.93    Greece  39.76 25.22 1.58 
El  Salvador  13.30  17.38 0.77    Iran  9.41  17.04 0.57    Guatemala  10.43  13.71 0.77    
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Estonia  26.26  31.68 0.83    Ireland  24.59  29.49 0.83    Hungary  34.85  28.53 1.22 
Ethiopia  14.04  10.45 1.34    Italy  37.01  26.48 1.40    Iceland  29.52  28.57 1.03 
Finland  35.88  30.55 1.17    Jordan  19.91  18.12 1.10    India  8.85  13.64 0.65 
France 40.90  26.12  1.57  Kazakhstan  10.64  27.02 0.39    Indonesia 13.41  15.61 0.86 
Germany  28.74  29.20 0.98    Kenya  19.83  11.89 1.67    Iran  9.82  17.26 0.57 
Ghana  18.30  14.20 1.29    Korea,  Rep.  15.85  23.55 0.67    Italy  36.17  26.23 1.38 
Greece 39.29  24.87  1.58    Latvia 27.01  29.76 0.91    Jamaica  25.75 22.27 1.16 
Guatemala  9.42  13.65 0.69    Madagascar  8.48  12.33 0.69    Jordan  18.40  17.85 1.03 
Hungary 34.85  28.53  1.22    Malaysia 19.26  22.40 0.86    Kazakhstan  10.57 23.45 0.46 
Iceland  29.29  28.79 1.02    Mexico  12.64  18.90 0.67    Kenya  17.88  11.97 1.50 
India  8.96  13.38 0.67    Moldova  27.17  21.77 1.25    Korea,  Rep.  18.18  23.61 0.77 
Indonesia  14.74  16.37 0.90    Morocco  24.63  17.55 1.41    Latvia  23.23  26.31 0.88 
Iran  9.62  17.15 0.57    Namibia  28.55  17.22 1.66    Lebanon  14.11  18.25 0.77 
Ireland  24.59  29.49 0.83    Nicaragua  14.50  16.03 0.90    Lithuania  24.77  26.27 0.94 
Italy  36.31  26.28 1.38    Oman  7.53  18.14 0.42    Luxembourg  38.57  41.62 0.93 
Jamaica  25.75  22.27 1.16    Pakistan  13.08  11.63 1.13    Malaysia  16.73  23.94 0.70 
Jordan  19.16  17.98 1.07    Panama  15.93  21.97 0.72    Mexico  12.72  19.64 0.65 
Kazakhstan 10.58  24.05 0.45    PNG  21.77  14.59 1.49    Moldova 20.30  22.64 0.90 
Kenya  18.96  11.92 1.59    Paraguay  11.54  13.31 0.87    Mongolia  28.54  20.41 1.40 
Korea,  Rep.  16.72  23.58 0.71    Peru  15.51  16.40 0.95    Morocco  26.07  18.55 1.41 
Latvia  23.86  26.89 0.89    Philippines  16.37  16.66 0.99    Namibia  29.23  18.25 1.61 
Lebanon  14.11  18.25 0.77    Portugal  32.65  26.17 1.25    Netherlands  38.66  31.50 1.23 
Lithuania  24.77  26.27 0.94    Senegal  15.76  14.21 1.11    New  Zealand  29.85  25.86 1.15 
Luxembourg  38.57  41.62 0.93    Sierra  Leone  9.19  12.85 0.72    Nicaragua  16.60  16.43 1.01 
Madagascar  8.48  12.33 0.69    Slovenia  34.93  28.19 1.24    Norway  37.03  31.97 1.16 
Malaysia  18.00  23.17 0.78    Spain  26.95  26.37 1.02    Oman  7.08  21.60 0.33 
Mexico  12.66  19.11 0.66    Sri  Lanka  16.64  18.53 0.90    Pakistan  10.97  11.14 0.98 
Moldova  21.45  22.49 0.96    Sudan  6.02  8.25 0.73    Panama  14.63  20.46 0.71 
Mongolia  28.54  20.41 1.40    Sweden  35.48  32.07 1.11    PNG  22.39  15.22 1.47 
Morocco  24.91  17.75 1.41    Switzerland  20.06  31.52 0.64    Paraguay  10.79  12.78 0.84 
Namibia  28.89  17.74 1.63    Syria  16.82  14.17 1.19    Peru  14.20  16.72 0.85 
Netherlands  38.66  31.50 1.23    Trinidad-Tobago 22.66  23.29 0.97    Philippines  13.37  17.58 0.76 
New  Zealand  29.85  25.86 1.15    Tunisia  25.18  19.25 1.31    Poland  29.35  24.16 1.22 
Nicaragua  15.55  16.23 0.96    Turkey  16.73  15.94 1.05    Portugal  33.92  25.37 1.34    
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Norway  37.03  31.97 1.16    Uganda  10.03  7.44 1.35    Romania  22.45  25.58 0.88 
Oman  7.36  19.44 0.38    United  Kingdom 35.66  29.18 1.22    Russian  Fed  23.54  22.15 1.06 
Pakistan  12.02  11.39 1.05    Uruguay  26.82  20.57 1.30    Senegal  17.10  14.55 1.17 
Panama  15.44  21.40 0.72    Venezuela  14.86  17.68 0.84    Sierra  Leone  6.82  8.27 0.82 
PNG  22.04  14.87 1.49    Vietnam  17.90  16.20 1.11    Slovak  Rep  30.75  27.49 1.12 
Paraguay  11.16  13.04 0.86    Yemen,  Rep.  10.28  12.16 0.84    Slovenia  36.72  27.49 1.34 
Peru  14.85  16.56 0.90    Zambia  17.82  14.99 1.19    South  Africa  24.90  18.48 1.35 
Philippines  14.87  17.12 0.87    Zimbabwe  23.65  17.48 1.35    Spain  25.74  23.73 1.08 
Poland  29.35 24.16  1.22             Sri  Lanka  14.77 21.60  0.72 
Portugal 33.50  25.64  1.31              Sudan  6.35  8.83  0.72 
Romania  22.45 25.58  0.88             Sweden  35.12 32.03  1.10 
Russian  Fed  23.54 22.15  1.06             Switzerland 19.25 31.63  0.61 
Senegal  16.43 14.38  1.14             Syria  17.49 14.59  1.20 
Sierra  Leone  8.79 12.09  0.74             Thailand  16.20 21.35  0.76 
Slovak  Rep  30.75 27.49  1.12             Tunisia  26.31 20.31  1.30 
Slovenia 36.42  27.61  1.32              Uganda  11.36  7.96  1.43 
South  Africa  24.90 18.48  1.35             Ukraine  22.71 25.00  0.91 
Spain 25.94  24.17  1.07              United  Kingdom 35.53 29.09  1.23 
Sri Lanka  15.81  19.89  0.82              United States  18.07  27.26  0.66 
Sudan 6.19  8.54  0.72             Uruguay  24.31  20.59  1.18 
Sweden  35.18 32.04  1.10             Venezuela  12.91 17.40  0.74 
Switzerland  19.70 31.57  0.62             Vietnam  16.50 17.90  0.92 
Syria  16.94 14.24  1.19             Yemen,  Rep. 9.42 13.53  0.70 
Thailand  16.20 21.35  0.76             Yugoslavia 33.27 19.97  1.67 
Trinidad-Tobago  22.66 23.29  0.97             Zambia  18.43 14.47  1.27 
Tunisia 25.74  19.78  1.30                     
Turkey 16.73  15.94  1.05                     
Uganda 11.14  7.88  1.41                     
Ukraine 22.71  25.00  0.91                     
United Kingdom  35.55  29.11  1.23                     
United States  18.07  27.26  0.66                     
Uruguay 25.57  20.58  1.24                    
Venezuela 13.89 17.54  0.79                       
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Effort                    
Vietnam 17.28  16.95  1.03                    
Yemen, Rep.  10.14  12.39  0.82                     
Yugoslavia 33.27  19.97  1.67                     
Zambia 17.92  14.90  1.20                     
Zimbabwe 23.65 17.48  1.35                       
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Annex 6: Actual vs. Predicted Revenue Capacity 
 




















Albania  14.60 18.11  0.82    Albania  14.60 18.11  0.82    Algeria 32.36 21.94  1.47 
Algeria  30.30 21.75  1.39    Algeria  28.65 21.59  1.33    Argentina  13.95 22.54  0.62 
Argentina  13.95 22.54  0.62    Austria  35.24 32.67  1.08    Armenia  16.40 22.36  0.73 
Armenia 16.40 22.36  0.73    Azerbaijan  16.80 21.37  0.79    Australia  23.41 28.80  0.81 
Australia 23.41 28.80  0.81    Bahrain  7.35 30.25  0.24    Austria 35.55 33.55  1.06 
Austria  35.50 33.40  1.06    Belarus  27.08 29.52  0.92    Azerbaijan  16.54 21.02  0.79 
Azerbaijan  16.67 21.20  0.79    Belgium  42.51 35.21  1.21    Bangladesh  7.79 15.66  0.50 
Bahrain  7.35 30.25  0.24    Botswana  17.08 25.18  0.68    Belarus 26.65 29.28  0.91 
Bangladesh  7.79 15.66  0.50    Brazil  20.18 21.24  0.95    Belgium  42.06 36.69  1.15 
Belarus  26.72 29.32  0.91    Bulgaria  26.55 27.18  0.98    Bolivia 14.80 19.26  0.77 
Belgium 42.13 36.45  1.16    Cameroon  8.94 12.12  0.74    Bulgaria  26.93 28.75  0.94 
Bolivia  14.80 19.26  0.77    Canada  19.36 32.25  0.60    Canada 19.83 33.36  0.59 
Botswana  17.08 25.18  0.68    China  5.25 19.93  0.26    Chile  17.87 26.63  0.67 
Brazil  20.18  21.24 0.95    DRC  4.35  7.90 0.64    China  7.49  20.74 0.36 
Bulgaria 26.74 27.97  0.96    Costa  Rica  18.26 24.04  0.76    Colombia  12.96 20.75  0.62 
Cameroon  8.94  12.12 0.74    Cote  D'Ivoire  18.69  17.67 1.06    DRC  4.36  5.39 0.86 
Canada  19.54 32.66  0.60    Croatia  43.53 29.02  1.50    Congo,  Rep.  9.92 25.55  0.39 
Chile  17.87 26.63  0.67    Cyprus  25.48 29.44  0.87    Costa  Rica  19.79 25.27  0.78 
China  6.37 20.33  0.31    Denmark  34.25 34.19  1.00    Cote  D'Ivoire 16.37 19.17  0.86 
Colombia  12.96 20.75  0.62    Dominican  15.00 23.97  0.63    Croatia 39.28 28.61  1.39 
DRC 4.35  6.78  0.74    Ecuador 12.40  19.82  0.63  Czech  Rep  30.85 32.31  0.96 
Congo,  Rep.  9.92 25.55  0.39    Egypt  19.23 19.78  0.97    Denmark  32.82 34.78  0.94 
Costa  Rica  19.02 24.66  0.77    Estonia  28.03 35.73  0.78    Dominican  15.73 24.89  0.63 
Cote  D'Ivoire  17.53 18.42  0.96    Finland  35.86 32.97  1.09    El  Salvador  13.30 22.78  0.58 
Croatia  39.99 28.68  1.41    France  40.49 30.07  1.35    Estonia 25.67 35.53  0.72 
Cyprus  25.48 29.44  0.87    Germany  28.71 32.26  0.89    Ethiopia  14.04 11.51  1.22 
Czech Rep  30.85  32.31 0.96    Greece  38.36  27.32 1.40    Finland 35.89 33.42 1.07    
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Denmark  33.06 34.68  0.95    Guatemala  8.41 17.04  0.49    France  40.99 29.36  1.40 
Dominican  15.37 24.43  0.63    Iceland  28.40 31.86  0.89    Germany  28.76 32.31  0.89 
Ecuador 12.40 19.82  0.63    India  9.06 15.25  0.60    Ghana  18.30 16.66  1.10 
Egypt 19.23  19.78  0.97    Indonesia 15.80  20.82 0.76    Greece  39.76 28.35 1.40 
El  Salvador  13.30 22.78  0.58    Iran  9.41 20.58  0.46    Guatemala  10.43 17.48  0.60 
Estonia  26.26 35.58  0.74    Ireland  24.59 33.63  0.73    Hungary  34.85 32.89  1.06 
Ethiopia 14.04 11.51  1.22    Italy  37.01 29.58  1.25    Iceland 29.52 31.31  0.94 
Finland  35.88 33.35  1.08    Jordan  19.91 26.16  0.76    India  8.85 16.39  0.54 
France 40.90  29.48  1.39  Kazakhstan  10.64  28.62 0.37    Indonesia 13.41  19.55 0.69 
Germany  28.74 32.29  0.89    Kenya  19.83 14.95  1.32    Iran  9.82 21.37  0.46 
Ghana  18.30 16.66  1.10    Korea,  Rep. 15.85 27.75  0.57    Italy  36.17 29.35  1.23 
Greece 39.29  28.01  1.40    Latvia 27.01  32.47 0.83    Jamaica  25.75 26.92 0.96 
Guatemala  9.42 17.26  0.55    Madagascar  8.48 16.16  0.53    Jordan  18.40 25.66  0.72 
Hungary 34.85 32.89  1.06    Malaysia 19.26  29.13 0.66    Kazakhstan  10.57 27.02 0.39 
Iceland  29.29 31.42  0.93    Mexico  12.64 24.14  0.52    Kenya  17.88 14.67  1.22 
India  8.96 15.82  0.57    Moldova  27.17 22.51  1.21    Korea,  Rep.  18.18 27.91  0.65 
Indonesia  14.74 20.25  0.73    Morocco  24.63 21.34  1.16    Latvia  23.23 29.84  0.78 
Iran  9.62 20.97  0.46    Namibia  28.55 23.73  1.20    Lebanon  14.11 22.88  0.62 
Ireland  24.59 33.63  0.73    Nicaragua  14.50 19.58  0.74    Lithuania  24.77 29.69  0.83 
Italy  36.31 29.39  1.24    Oman  7.53 25.23  0.30    Luxembourg  38.57 46.64  0.83 
Jamaica  25.75 26.92  0.96    Pakistan  13.08 15.03  0.87    Malaysia  16.73 31.07  0.54 
Jordan  19.16 25.91  0.74    Panama  15.93 28.93  0.55    Mexico 12.72 24.95  0.51 
Kazakhstan 10.58  27.29 0.39    PNG  21.77  18.13 1.20    Moldova 20.30  24.25 0.84 
Kenya  18.96 14.83  1.28    Paraguay  11.54 17.50  0.66    Mongolia  28.54 24.71  1.16 
Korea,  Rep.  16.72 27.81  0.60    Peru  15.51 21.24  0.73    Morocco  26.07 22.29  1.17 
Latvia  23.86 30.28  0.79    Philippines 16.37 21.11  0.78    Namibia  29.23 23.82  1.23 
Lebanon 14.11 22.88  0.62    Portugal  32.65 29.95  1.09    Netherlands  38.66 35.48  1.09 
Lithuania  24.77 29.69  0.83    Senegal  15.76 18.92  0.83    New  Zealand 29.85 28.86  1.03 
Luxembourg  38.57 46.64  0.83    Sierra  Leone 9.19 11.28  0.85    Nicaragua  16.60 20.56  0.81 
Madagascar  8.48 16.16  0.53    Slovenia  34.93 32.02  1.09    Norway  37.03 34.67  1.07    
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Malaysia 18.00 30.10  0.60    Spain  26.95 29.51  0.91    Oman  7.08 27.53  0.26 
Mexico  12.66 24.37  0.52    Sri  Lanka  16.64 21.52  0.78    Pakistan  10.97 14.69  0.75 
Moldova  21.45  23.96 0.90    Sudan    6.02  9.69 0.62    Panama    14.63  26.90 0.54 
Mongolia    28.54 24.71  1.16    Sweden    35.48 34.82  1.02    PNG  22.39 19.17  1.17 
Morocco   24.91  21.53  1.16    Switzerland   20.06  34.32  0.58    Paraguay   10.79  16.96  0.64 
Namibia   28.89  23.77  1.22    Syria   16.82  17.71  0.95    Peru   14.20  21.27  0.67 
Netherlands    38.66 35.48  1.09    Trinidad-Tobago 22.66 28.36  0.80    Philippines    13.37 22.67  0.59 
New Zealand   29.85  28.86  1.03    Tunisia   25.18  23.99  1.05    Poland   29.35  27.84  1.06 
Nicaragua   15.55  20.07  0.77    Turkey   16.73  19.97  0.84    Portugal   33.92  29.47  1.15 
Norway   37.03  34.67  1.07    Uganda   10.03  9.19  1.09    Romania   22.45  27.04  0.83 
Oman   7.36  26.09  0.28    United Kingdom  35.66  32.23  1.11    Russian Fed   23.54  25.66  0.92 
Pakistan   12.02  14.86  0.81    Uruguay   26.82  24.40  1.10    Senegal   17.10  19.16  0.89 
Panama    15.44  28.17 0.55    Venezuela    14.86  23.43 0.63    Sierra  Leone  6.82  6.49 1.05 
PNG  22.04 18.59  1.19    Vietnam    17.90 19.25  0.93    Slovak  Rep  30.75 32.53  0.95 
Paraguay   11.16  17.23  0.65    Yemen, Rep.  10.28  18.52  0.55    Slovenia   36.72  31.79  1.15 
Peru    14.85 21.25  0.70    Zambia    17.82 19.78  0.90    South  Africa  24.90 24.20  1.03 
Philippines  14.87 21.89  0.68    Zimbabwe  23.65 21.47  1.10    Spain  25.74 27.94  0.92 
Poland  29.35 27.84  1.06             Sri  Lanka  14.77 23.90  0.63 
Portugal 33.50 29.63  1.13             Sudan  6.35 10.59  0.60 
Romania 22.45 27.04  0.83             Sweden 35.12 34.97  1.00 
Russian  Fed  23.54 25.66  0.92             Switzerland  19.25 34.70  0.55 
Senegal  16.43 19.04  0.86             Syria  17.49 18.55  0.94 
Sierra  Leone  8.79 10.49  0.88             Thailand  16.20 26.28  0.62 
Slovak  Rep  30.75 32.53  0.95             Tunisia 26.31 24.75  1.06 
Slovenia 36.42 31.83  1.14             Uganda 11.36 11.04  1.03 
South  Africa  24.90 24.20  1.03             Ukraine  22.71 27.24  0.83 
Spain  25.94 28.20  0.92             UK  35.53 32.24  1.10 
Sri Lanka  15.81  22.58  0.71              United States 18.07  30.20  0.60 
Sudan  6.19 10.14  0.61             Uruguay  24.31 24.45  0.99 
Sweden  35.18 34.94  1.01             Venezuela  12.91 23.07  0.56    
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Switzerland  19.70 34.49  0.57             Vietnam  16.50 21.22  0.78 
Syria  16.94 17.85  0.95             Yemen  9.42 19.27  0.49 
Thailand 16.20 26.28  0.62             Yugoslavia  33.27 22.40  1.49 
Trinidad 22.66 28.36  0.80             Zambia 18.43 18.10  1.02 
Tunisia  25.74  24.37  1.06                   
Turkey  16.73  19.97  0.84                   
Uganda  11.14  10.73  1.04                   
Ukraine  22.71  27.24  0.83                   
UK  35.55  32.24  1.10                   
United  States  18.07  30.20  0.60                   
Uruguay  25.57  24.43  1.05                   
Venezuela  13.89  23.25  0.60                   
Vietnam  17.28  20.12  0.86                   
Yemen  10.14  18.64  0.54                   
Yugoslavia  33.27  22.40  1.49                   
Zambia  17.92  19.50  0.92                   
Zimbabwe  23.65  21.47  1.10                      
 
 